ANDY CLARK SUPERSIZING THE MIND PDF

Apr 13, Krishna rated it really liked it Are cognitive processes confined to occur within the limits of the biological brain, or can resources recruited from the body or even from the extended environment be combined with neural capabilities to create an extended mind? The answer brings up futurist scenarios in which implantable chips or distributed computing resources can be recruited as aids to memory or cognitive Are cognitive processes confined to occur within the limits of the biological brain, or can resources recruited from the body or even from the extended environment be combined with neural capabilities to create an extended mind? The answer brings up futurist scenarios in which implantable chips or distributed computing resources can be recruited as aids to memory or cognitive processing. But fascinatingly, Clark also shows how the embedded mind is not just a futurist potential, but is also exemplified by current, everyday practices.

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Clark and Chalmers present the idea of "active externalism" similar to semantic externalism , in which objects within the environment function as a part of the mind. They argue that the separation between the mind, the body, and the environment is an unprincipled distinction. Because external objects play a significant role in aiding cognitive processes, the mind and the environment act as a "coupled system" that can be seen as a complete cognitive system of its own.

In this manner, the mind is extended into the physical world. The main criterion that Clark and Chalmers list for classifying the use of external objects during cognitive tasks as a part of an extended cognitive system is that the external objects must function with the same purpose as the internal processes.

The fictional characters Otto and Inga are both travelling to a museum simultaneously. Inga is able to recall the internal directions within her memory. The notebook qualifies as such because it is constantly and immediately accessible to Otto, and it is automatically endorsed by him. The thought experiment has been criticised with the notion that what happens with Otto is not very similar to what happens with Inga.

This criticism is addressed by Clark in Supersizing the Mind: "[the] claim was not that the processes in Otto and Inga are identical, or even similar, in terms of their detailed implementation. It is simply that, with respect to the role that the long-term encodings play in guiding current response, both modes of storage can be seen as supporting dispositional beliefs. It is the way the information is poised to guide reasoning … and behavior that counts.

It uses a coarse-grained functionalism about the mind that ignores plausible differences between internal and external processes, such as differences between beliefs and external props and devices; or for creating a notion of cognition too heterogeneous to make up a scientific natural kind.

Each of these arguments is addressed in Clark , in which he notes: [5] While coupling is important for cognition, that is not to say that it is sufficient — the coupling must play a functional role in cognition.

Any putative part of a system — internal or external — is unlikely to yield "cognition" on its own. Thus, examples such as calculators, pencils, should be considered in parallel with neural regions.

Simply looking at the part is not enough for cognition. One can imagine circumstances under which a biological being might retain information in non-neural ways a hypothetical Martian with a bitmap-based memory, or humans with prosthetics to support memory. Thus, being neural cannot be a necessary condition for being cognitive.

While in Supersizing the Mind Clark defends a strong version of the hypothesis of extended cognition contrasted with a hypothesis of embedded cognition in other work, some of these objections have inspired more moderate reformulations of the extended mind thesis.

This version might be understood as emphasizing the explanatory value of the extended mind thesis for cognitive science rather than maintaining it as an ontological claim about the nature of mind or cognition. Embedded functioning only in a related external environment. Enacted involving not only neural processes, but also things an organism does. The field of extended cognition focuses upon the processes involved in this creation, and subsumes these processes as part of consciousness.

Which is no longer confined to the brain or body, but involves interaction with the environment.

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Andy Clark

Clark and Chalmers present the idea of "active externalism" similar to semantic externalism , in which objects within the environment function as a part of the mind. They argue that the separation between the mind, the body, and the environment is an unprincipled distinction. Because external objects play a significant role in aiding cognitive processes, the mind and the environment act as a "coupled system" that can be seen as a complete cognitive system of its own. In this manner, the mind is extended into the physical world.

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Supersizing the Mind

Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension Andy Clark Abstract Studies of mind, thought, and reason have tended to marginalize the role of bodily form, real-world action, and environmental backdrop. In recent years, both in philosophy and cognitive science, this tendency has been identified and, increasingly, resisted. Work in this new, loosely-knit field depicts thought and reason as in some way inextricably tied to the details of our gross bodily form, our habits of action and intervention, and the enabling web of social, cultural More Studies of mind, thought, and reason have tended to marginalize the role of bodily form, real-world action, and environmental backdrop. Work in this new, loosely-knit field depicts thought and reason as in some way inextricably tied to the details of our gross bodily form, our habits of action and intervention, and the enabling web of social, cultural, and technological scaffolding in which we live, move, learn, and think. But exactly what kind of link is at issue? And what difference might such a link or links make to our best philosophical, psychological, and computational models of thought and reason?

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Supersizing the Mind : Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension

Of course, philosophers of mind have, for the most part, already jettisoned the idea that minds are an ethereal sort of non-physical substance. We can now assert with no great temerity that Descartes was wrong about that. Even so, one might still agree with Descartes that minds are in some sense distinct from bodies. They are, as it were, in the head.

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